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REDEFINING THE BADGES OF SLAVERY
Nicholas Serafin*
ABSTRACT
In The Civil Rights Cases the Supreme Court held that Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority to eliminate the
“badges of slavery.” Many legal scholars have argued that some
contemporary injustices impose a badge of slavery and thus can be addressed
via Section 2 legislation. For example, Section 2 has been cited as grounds
for addressing hate speech, racial profiling, sexual orientation
discrimination, violence against women, limitations on the right to an
abortion, sexual harassment, and more.
But what precisely is a badge of slavery? Relatively few legal
scholars have attempted to answer this prior question. Those who have argue
that the badges metaphor referred narrowly to antebellum practices that
threatened to reimpose chattel slavery. According to this view, few, if any,
contemporary injustices threaten to reimpose chattel slavery, and so few, if
any badges of slavery remain. Thus, legislation addressing contemporary
injustices falls outside of Congress’s Section 2 authority.
No one has attempted to defend a more expansive view of Section 2
by appealing to the legal history and to the original public meaning of the
badges metaphor. This paper provides just such a defense. In this Article I
demonstrate that the badges metaphor has always possessed a broad range
of application. The badges metaphor extended beyond race and chattel
slavery to gender- and class-based subordination. Moreover, the badges
metaphor first appears not in the Civil Rights Cases, as is most often claimed,
but in Dred Scott v. Sandford. Justice Taney’s usage of the metaphor in Dred
Scott is deeply revealing and supports an expansive reading of Section 2, yet
it has been overlooked by contemporary legal scholars.
Drawing on the popular and legal history of the badges metaphor, I
defend the view that a badge of slavery results from laws or social customs
that impose stigmatic harms upon subordinate social groups. I then
demonstrate how this expansive understanding of Section 2 can be used to
support attempts to eradicate contemporary badges of slavery.

* Assistant Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. I am grateful to Elizabeth Anderson,
Derrick Darby, Scott Hershovitz, Don Herzog, Jack Balkin, Claire Priest, and members of the Santa Clara
University School of Law Faculty Enrichment Committee, for critical feedback.
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INTRODUCTION
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the authority
to eliminate the “badges and incidents” of slavery.1 What constitutes an
incident of slavery is clear: the incidents of slavery are the legal restrictions,
such as submission to a master and a ban on the ownership of productive
property, that were inherent in the institution of slavery itself.2 What
constitutes a badge of slavery is far less certain, and relatively few legal
scholars have examined the historical meaning of the metaphor.
1

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883) (holding that Section 2 grants Congress
the “power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents of
slavery in the United States”).
2
See, e.g., Jennifer Mason McAward, Defining the Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 14
U. PA. J. CONST. L., 570-2 (2012) (citing various historical sources indicating that “an
“incident” of slavery was an aspect of the law that was inherently tied to or that flowed
directly from the institution of slavery—a legal restriction that applied to slaves qua slaves
or a legal right that inhered in slaveowners qua slaveowners”); accord George A. Rutherglen,
The Badges and Incidents of Slavery and the Power of Congress to Enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment, in THE PROMISES OF LIBERTY: THE HISTORY AND CONTEMPORARY RELEVANCE
OF THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT (Alexander Tsesis ED., 2010) [hereinafter THE PROMISES
OF LIBERTY] 163, 164.
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Nevertheless, there has emerged a renewed interest in Section 2, such that the
literature now abounds with proposals for eliminating contemporary badges
of slavery. Section 2 has been cited as grounds for addressing hate speech,3
the removal of confederate monuments,4 racial profiling,5 sexual orientation
discrimination,6 violence against women,7 limitations on the right to an
abortion,8 sexual harassment,9 sweatshop labor,10 and more.11
Yet there is a widening gulf between those who invoke the badges
metaphor in support of contemporary legislative proposals and those who
have examined the history of the metaphor itself. For legal scholars like Jack
Balkin, Akhil Amar, Alexander Tsesis, and Andrew Koppelman, the badges
metaphor can be used to characterize a number of present day injustices,
injustices that Congress can address via its Section 2 authority.12 Lending
support to this view is a series of modern cases, beginning with Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., in which the Supreme Court held that Congress may
“determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery” and “translate
that determination into effective legislation,” subject only to rational basis
review.13 If this view is correct, Congress’s Section 2 authority is more
3

See Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the Missing Amendments: RAV v. City of St. Paul,
106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 155 (1992).
4
Alexander Tsesis, Confederate Monuments As Badges of Slavery, 108 KY. L.J. 695
(2020).
5
William M. Carter Jr., A Thirteenth Amendment Framework for Combating Racial
Profiling, 39 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 17 (2004).
6
David P. Tedhams, The Reincarnation of “Jim Crow”: A Thirteenth Amendment
Analysis of Colorado’s Amendment 2, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 133, 155 (1994).
7
See Jeffrey J. Pokorak, Rape as a Badge of Slavery: The Legal History of, and
Remedies for, Prosecutorial Race-of-Victim Charging Disparities, 7 NEV. L.J. 1 (2006); see
also Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude and
the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207 (1992); Pamela Bridgewater,
Reproductive Freedom as Civil Freedom: The Thirteenth Amendment’s Role in the Struggle
for Reproductive Rights, 3 IOWA J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 401 (2000); Marcellene Elizabeth
Hearn, Comment, A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of the Violence Against Women Act, 146
U. OF PA L. REV. 1097 (1998).
8
Andrew Koppelman, Forced Labor: A Thirteenth Amendment Defense of Abortion, 84
NW. U. L. REV 480 (1990).
9
Jennifer L. Conn, Sexual Harassment: A Thirteenth Amendment Response, 28 COLUM.
J. OF L. & SOC. PROBS. 519 (1995).
10
Samantha C. Halem, Slaves to Fashion: A Thirteenth Amendment Litigation Strategy
to Abolish Sweatshops in the Garment Industry, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 397 (1999).
11
See, e.g., Sarah C. Courtman, Comment, Sweet Land of Liberty: The Case Against the
Federal Marriage Amendment, 24 PACE L. REV. 301 (2003).
12
See Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801 (2010);
Amar, supra note 3; Koppelman, supra note 8; Tsesis, supra note 4.
13
392 U.S. 409, 440; see also Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 170 (1976)
(reaffirming Jones' holding that under Section 2 Congress has the power “rationally to
determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and...to translate that
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expansive than is commonly recognized and Section 2 can be used to address
a number of contemporary injustices.
The problem is that while this scholarship may be convincing in some
respects, rarely do these authors offer much historical evidence regarding the
meaning of the badges metaphor itself. Moreover, recent Articles by George
Rutherglen, Jennifer Mason McAward, and William Carter Jr. have examined
the history of the metaphor and have plausibly argued that Congressional
authority under Section 2 is narrowly restricted. Broadly speaking, this latter
group of legal scholars argues that the badges metaphor possesses a limited,
historically determined meaning that cannot sustain most contemporary
Section 2 proposals.14 Drawing on legal history and on the original public
meaning of the badges metaphor, these scholars contend that in the
postbellum legal context the badges metaphor referred narrowly to practices
that threatened to reimpose chattel slavery or its de facto equivalent. Since
few, if any, contemporary injustices threaten to reimpose chattel slavery or
its de facto equivalent, few, if any, badges of slavery remain. Hence, on this
view, Congress generally lacks a predicate for the exercise of its Section 2
authority, and should Congress attempt to enact new Section 2 legislation,
heightened judicial scrutiny would be warranted.
No one has yet attempted to defend an expansive view of Section 2
by appealing to legal history and to the original public meaning of the badges
metaphor. This Article provides just such a defense. While legal scholars
advocating for a narrow understanding of Section 2 present a compelling
case, I argue in this Article that previous scholarship on the badges metaphor
has overlooked just how often and how broadly the badges metaphor
appeared in American public discourse. Furthermore, previous scholarship
on the badges metaphor has misidentified the legal origins of the term. By
introducing new historical and legal evidence I shall demonstrate that the
badges metaphor, both in popular discourse and as a legal term of art, has
always possessed a broad range of application. More specifically, I argue
that the badges metaphor referred to state actions or social customs that
stigmatized subordinate social groups. On the view I shall defend, laws or
social customs that impose stigmatic harms upon particular groups are
appropriate targets of Section 2 legislation.
In Section I I canvass recent legal scholarship regarding the badges
metaphor and contemporary applications of Section 2. I demonstrate that
determination into effective legislation”) (citations omitted); Griffin v. Breckenridge 403
U.S. 88, 105 (1971) (concluding that “Congress was wholly within its powers under § 2 of
the Thirteenth Amendment in creating a statutory cause of action for Negro citizens who
have been the victims of conspiratorial, racially discriminatory private action aimed at
depriving them of the basic rights that the law secures to all free men.”).
14
See infra Section I.
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existing scholarship on the history of the badges metaphor largely cuts
against an expansive understanding of Section 2. While my overall aim is to
vindicate an expansive understanding of Section 2, legal scholars advocating
for a restrictive understanding of Section 2 draw upon historical, textual, and
legal evidence that cannot be ignored. Moreover, scholars who seek to
eradicate contemporary badges of slavery have generally not engaged with
the history of the metaphor. As a result, most contemporary badges proposals
are not obviously grounded in any broader, historically-grounded account of
Congress’s Section 2 authority.
In Section II I revisit the history of the badges metaphor. I trace the
origins of the badges metaphor to the Greco-Roman practices of physically
marking slaves and other low status individuals. I then survey the
development of the metaphor within feudal Europe and the appearance of the
metaphor within 18th century American political discourse. The history I
survey reveals that the badges metaphor extended beyond race and chattel
slavery to gender- and class-based subordination. This is in part because the
badges metaphor grew out of the republican intellectual tradition, according
to which slavery consisted of the public or private exercise of arbitrary
authority. I then consider the history of the badges metaphor in American
constitutional law. Many constitutional law scholars have claimed that the
badges metaphor first appears in early post-bellum cases such as United
States v. Rhodes, Blyew v. United States, and The Civil Rights Cases.15 As I
demonstrate, however, the badges metaphor appears much earlier, in Dred
Scott v. Sandford. The metaphor’s appearance in Dred Scott is deeply
revealing and supports an expansive reading of Section 2, yet it has been
overlooked by contemporary legal scholars.
Finally, in Section III I discuss how Section 2 should be applied to
contemporary issues.
To ground this discussion I consider the
constitutionality of the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes
Prevention Act, a 2009 piece of federal legislation that Congress enacted in
part under Section 2. While proponents of the restrictive interpretation have
criticized the constitutionality of the Act, I argue that, given the historical
usage of the badges metaphor, the Act is well within Congress’s Section 2
authority. I then consider arguments for extending Section 2 to cover
violence against women. I conclude by arguing that, in light of the history of
the badges metaphor, any group that is singled out for status-based
deprivations of rights, liberties, or privileges warrants Section 2 protection.

15

See, e.g., Rutherglen, supra note 2 at 172-3; accord McAward, supra note 2 563;
Akhil Reed Amar, Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747, 826 n.301; Balkin, supra note
12 at 1817 n.64; James Gray Pope, Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment and the Badges
and Incidents of Slavery, 65 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 426, 428 (2018).
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I. THE RESTRICTIVE INTERPRETATION
In the Civil Rights Cases the Supreme Court held that Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the “right to enact all necessary and
proper laws for the obliteration and prevention of slavery with all its badges
and incidents.”16 While the phrase “badge of slavery” had been in circulation
for some time, during the antebellum period literal slave badges were
exceedingly rare, and references to the badges of slavery were plainly
metaphorical.17 Yet the Civil Rights Cases majority did not offer a clear
definition of the metaphor, leaving undefined the full extent of Congress’s
Section 2 authority. An interpretation the badges metaphor is thus required
in order to identify the limits of Congress’s Section 2 authority. It is important
to identify these limits because the potential scope of application of Section
2 is vast: the Thirteenth Amendment contains no state action requirement;18
the Amendment can sustain legislation applicable to persons of all races;19
and, according to current precedent, Congress may define the badges of
slavery subject only to rational basis review.20
Legal scholars working on the history and meaning of the badges
metaphor aim to provide historically informed guidelines for Section 2
legislation. According to Jennifer Mason McAward, for example, from
16

109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
See Rutherglen, supra note 2 at 165 (citation omitted).
18
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 at 20 (stating that the Thirteenth Amendment “is
not a mere prohibition of State laws establishing or upholding slavery, but an absolute
declaration that slavery or involuntary servitude shall not exist in any part of the United
States”).
19
See United States v. Rhodes, 27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (C.C.D. Ky. I866) (No. 16,151)
(holding that the Thirteenth Amendment “throws its protection over everyone, of every race,
color, and condition”); The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 72 (1873)
(asserting that “[u]ndoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress
which proposed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter.
If Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the Mexican
or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to make it void.”);
McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 286 (1976) (holding that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981, “which derives its operative language from § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866…explicitly applies to “all persons” (emphasis added), including white persons”);
Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971) (concluding that § 1985 (3), enacted under
the Thirteenth Amendment, applies to “racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously
discriminatory” private conspiracies); Shaare Tefila Congregation v. Cobb, 481 U. 615
(1987) (holding that 42 U. S. C. §§1981 applies to discrimination targeting Jewish
individuals); Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987) (holding that
§ 1981 applies to discrimination targeting individuals of Arabian ancestry because “Congress
intended to protect from discrimination identifiable classes of persons who are subjected to
intentional discrimination solely because of their ancestry or ethnic characteristics”);
20
See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443 (1968).
17
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historical work on the badges metaphor legal scholars can derive “an
objective methodology under which Congress and the courts can analyze the
historical record and translate that analysis into workable constraints on
legislation.”21 McAward argues that the metaphor’s historically narrow
range of usage indicates that Congress’s authority under Section 2 is similarly
constrained. In her view, the badges metaphor possesses a “finite,
historically-determined range of meaning,” and from this historicallydetermined range of meaning one can derive a principled basis for preventing
against Congressional overreach.22
As I discuss below, legal scholars who have examined the history of
the badges metaphor have tended to take a much narrower view of Congress’s
Section 2 authority than legal scholars who have applied the badges metaphor
to contemporary legal issues. According to McAward, for example, the claim
that “Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment confers on Congress a broad
power to legislate against discrimination generally overlooks this precise
terminology and tends to devalue the immediate aftermath of the slave
system.”23 In light of his reading of the badges metaphor, William M. Carter,
Jr. is similarly skeptical of views according to which Congressional authority
under Section 2 extends to “any discrimination that is suffered because of
membership in any identifiable group.”24 Both scholars present a plausible
and historically-supported account of the badges metaphor and of Section 2.
In the following Part I unpack these views; in Section II I defend a historically
grounded but more expansive view of the badges metaphor.
A. From Political Rhetoric to Legal Term of Art
Only recently have legal scholars begun to examine the historical
usage and meaning of the badges metaphor. While there is no scholarly
consensus per se, for the sake of clarity I shall present the work of these
scholars as a more or less unitary interpretive framework, which I will refer
to as the “restrictive” interpretation of the badges metaphor.25 According to
the restrictive interpretation, there existed a rhetorical or political usage of
“badge of slavery,” which was common in political discourse during the
antebellum period, and a distinctively legal usage of the metaphor, which was
21

See McAward, supra note 2 at 568.
Jennifer Mason McAward, The Scope of Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment
Enforcement Power After City of Boerne v. Flores, 88 WASH. U. L. REV. 77, 144 (2010).
23
See McAward, supra note 2 at 566.
24
See William M. Carter Jr., Race, Rights, and the Thirteenth Amendment: Defining the
Badges and Incidents of Slavery, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1311, 1366 (2006).
25
For a similar characterization of this debate, see George Rutherglen, The Thirteenth
Amendment, the Power of Congress, and the Shifting Sources of Civil Rights Law, 112
COLUM. L. REV. 1551 (2012).
22
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not.26 On this view, though often invoked in political argument, the common,
public usage of the metaphor lacked the relative clarity and stability of
meaning of a legal term of art.27 Whatever its original meaning, or meanings,
in political discourse, the badges metaphor initially had no distinctively legal
significance.
According to the restrictive interpretation, the badges metaphor, as a
piece of political rhetoric, first circulated in the speeches and writings of
American abolitionists and Republican politicians, for whom the badges
metaphor primarily referred to the public association of African American
skin color with chattel slavery.28 For example, “in an argument before the
Supreme Court in 1843, a lawyer for a slave seeking freedom…offered the
following observation about American slavery: “[c]olour in a slaveholding
state is a badge of slavery. It is not so where slavery does not exist.””29
Similarly, during Congressional debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
Senator James Harlan of Iowa, describing the Roman practice of slavery,
noted that “[c]olor at Rome was not even a badge of degradation. It had no
application to the question of slavery.”30
To be sure, as proponents of the restrictive interpretation
acknowledge, skin color was perhaps not the only badge of slavery. During
these same debates the Act’s sponsor, Senator Lyman Trumbull, defined a
badge of servitude as “any statute which is not equal to all, and which
deprives any citizen of civil rights which are secured to other citizens.”31
While this would seem to cut against the restrictive interpretation, McAward
argues that Trumbull is here simply equating the badges metaphor with the
legal incidents of slavery.32 Similarly, for the abolitionist William Lloyd
Garrison anti-miscegenation laws constituted “a disgraceful badge of
servitude.”33 Yet, according to Rutherglen, “this sense of “badge” rarely
26

See McAward, supra note 2 at 576 (asserting that “[a]ntebellum legal references to
the “badge of slavery” were relatively infrequent, but the term was commonly used in the
rhetoric of abolitionists as well as the mainstream press”); accord Rutherglen, supra note 2
at 166 (observing that “[u]nlike its legal use, the political use of [the badges metaphor] was
common in the antebellum era”).
27
See McAward, supra note 2 at 575 (asserting that “[i]t is possible to identify a range
of meanings for the term but difficult to define it precisely”); accord See Rutherglen, supra
note 2 at 164 (noting that the metaphor referred generally to “evidence of political
subjugation” but possesses “inherent ambiguity”).
28
See Rutherglen, supra note 2 at 165-6; accord McAward, supra note 2 at 576 (arguing
that "[a]ntebellum legal references to the “badge of slavery” were relatively infrequent, but
the term was commonly used in the rhetoric of abolitionists as well as the mainstream press").
29
See Rutherglen, supra note 2 at 166 (citation omitted).
30
See CONG. GLOBE, 38th Cong. (1st Sess.) 1439 (1864).
31
See CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong. (1st Sess.) 474 (1866).
32
See McAward, supra note 2 at 578.
33
See Rutherglen, supra note 2 at 165. (citations omitted).
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appeared in the law of slavery.”34 Overall, for proponents of the restrictive
interpretation, throughout the 19th century the badges metaphor “had a
relatively narrow range of meanings, referring to the color of an African
American’s skin or other indications of legal and social inferiority connected
with slavery.”35
After emerging in 19th century political discourse as a metaphorical
reference to skin color and to the incidents of American slavery, the badges
metaphor was then adopted by the federal courts.36 According to proponents
of the restrictive interpretation, and in the view of many other constitutional
scholars, the origins of the metaphor as a distinctly legal term of art can be
traced to a series of federal court cases concerning the scope of Congress’s
enforcement power under Section 2.37 In the 1866 case United States v.
Rhodes, for instance, Justice Swayne, riding circuit, observed that free
African Americans during the antebellum period “had but few civil and no
political rights in the slave states. Many of the badges of the bondman’s
degradation were fastened upon them.”38 Justice Bradley, dissenting in the
1871 case Blyew v. United States, asserted that to “deprive a whole class” of
the right to provide testimony in criminal prosecutions “is to brand them with
a badge of slavery; is to expose them to wanton insults and fiendish assaults;
is to leave their lives, their families, and their property unprotected by law.”39
Writing for the majority roughly a decade later in the Civil Rights
Cases, Justice Bradley once again invoked the metaphor, arguing that Section
2 “clothes Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for
abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.”40 But
Bradley construed the metaphor narrowly, limiting the badges of slavery to
public laws that approximated the “burdens and incapacities [that] were the
inseparable incidents of [slavery].”41 According to Bradley, during the
antebellum period private acts of discrimination targeting free African
Americans were not considered badges of slavery, because “no one at that
time” thought that African Americans ought to be “admitted to all the
privileges enjoyed by white citizens,” such as equal access to public
facilities.42
34

See Rutherglen, supra note 2 at 166.
See McAward, supra note 2 at 581.
36
See Rutherglen, supra note 2 at 172 (arguing that the “trajectory of [the metaphor's]
rise to prominence was from Senator Trumbull to [Justice Bradley’s] majority opinion in the
Civil Rights Cases).
37
See supra note 15.
38
27 F. Cas. 785, 793 (D. Ky. 1866).
39
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581, 599 (1872).
40
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, at 20 (1883).
41
Id. at 22.
42
Id. at 25.
35
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The restrictive interpretation maintains that the metaphor’s
transformation into a distinctively legal term of art constituted a break with
the metaphor as political rhetoric.43 On this view, from Rhodes to the Civil
Rights Cases the metaphor was “transform[ed] and broaden[ed]…to refer to
the broader set of political, civil, and legal disadvantages imposed on slaves,
former slaves, and free blacks.”44 This transformation followed postemancipation attempts to re-enslave newly freed blacks, such that the badges
metaphor, in the postbellum legal context, came to refer to public laws that
threatened to reimpose chattel slavery or its de facto equivalent.45
In sum, proponents of the restrictive interpretation closely link the
badges metaphor to the incidents of slavery and to postbellum practices that
approximated the incidents of slavery. According to this view, there existed
a rhetorical or political usage of the badges metaphor distinct from the legal
term of art; the metaphor, as a legal term of art, referred to the incidents of
slavery, and to legal disabilities imposed upon newly freed African
Americans that approximated the incidents of slavery; and, the federal
judiciary first took up the metaphor in cases such as Blyew, Rhodes, and the
Civil Rights Cases as a gloss on the scope of Congressional authority under
Section 2. From this historical analysis proponents of the restrictive
interpretation conclude that Congress’s contemporary Section 2 authority is
limited to addressing contemporary legal attempts to reestablish chattel
slavery or its de facto equivalent. Section 2, according to this view, is
“prophylactic,” in the sense that Section 2 forbids “conduct beyond actual
enslavement” in order to prevent the “de facto reemergence” of slavery.46
In Section 2 I criticize these claims and offer an alternative view of
the badges metaphor. First, however, to get a sense of what is at stake, I shall
introduce some of the main questions concerning the badges metaphor and
the scope of Section 2.
B. Defining the Scope of Section 2
It is helpful to frame the relationship between the badges metaphor
and Section 2 as revolving around a set of interrelated questions.47 First, to
which groups does the metaphor apply? Is the imposition of badge of slavery
limited to the descendants of slaves or to racial and ethnic minorities
43
See McAward, supra note 2 at 575 (claiming that the metaphor's “meaning appeared
to evolve from the antebellum to postbellum eras, particularly as it migrated from colloquial
to legal use”).
44
Id. at 578.
45
Id. at 581, 569.
46
See McAward, supra note 23 at 84.
47
This framing roughly follows that of McAward. See McAward, supra note 2 at 605.
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generally, or can badges of slavery be imposed upon other groups as well?
Second, to which practices does the metaphor refer? Is the badges metaphor
limited to practices that were integral to or closely associated with chattel
slavery, or should other, less central aspects of chattel slavery fall within its
scope? In this survey I shall describe approaches as restrictive or expansive
depending upon the answers they provide to the above questions, though
these descriptive labels are intended merely to situate different views in
relation to the literature as a whole.
To which groups does the badges metaphor apply? The most
restrictive approach to Section 2 identifies African Americans as the only
group to which the badges metaphor can apply. Though this approach is
generally rejected by courts and scholars, it is not without some prima facie
support. As I noted above, according to the restrictive interpretation, the
badges metaphor was used primarily to refer to the skin color of African
Americans and to legal burdens associated with enslavement. Moreover,
while members of the Reconstruction Congress evinced concern for other
racial groups, African Americans were foremost in mind during the debates
over the 13th Amendment and other Reconstruction-era legislation. No
plausible approach to the badges metaphor – or to the 13th Amendment more
broadly – can overlook the centrality of African American subjugation to
American chattel slavery and to the badges thereof. On the other hand, the
13th Amendment was written in race-neutral terms, and subsequent court
precedent has confirmed that the 13th Amendment extends to other racial
groups.48 Thus, while concern for the subjugation of African Americans
surely lies at the heart of the 13th Amendment, the power to eliminate the
badges of slavery under Section 2 may extend to other groups as well.
Much of the current debate surrounding the scope of the badges
metaphor takes place between these two poles. Broadly speaking, proponents
of a relatively expansive approach to Section 2 support the application of the
badges metaphor to any social group that is subjected to some key aspect of
American chattel slavery. Sydney Buchanan first staked out this position.
According to Buchanan, any act of arbitrary, group-based prejudice imposes
upon its victims a badge of slavery.49 This is because, Buchanan argues, “[a]
chief vice of the institution of slavery was its arbitrary irrationality.”50
Moreover, Buchanan claims, supporters of the Thirteenth Amendment and of
the 1866 Civil Rights Act “were intensely concerned with [group-based]
48

See supra note 19.
G. Sidney Buchanan, The Quest for Freedom: A Legal History of the Thirteenth
Amendment, 12 HOUS. L. REV. 1069, 1074 (1975) (claiming that “[t]here is nothing in this
language that confines the enforcement power of Congress to the protection of any particular
race or class of persons”).
50
Id. at 1073.
49
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prejudice.”51 Thus, for Buchanan, legislation targeting widespread, arbitrary,
group-based prejudice is a valid exercise of Congressional authority under
Section 2, regardless of the identity of the group toward which this prejudice
is directed.
Jack Balkin defines slavery more narrowly than Buchanan but
defends a view that is perhaps just as expansive. According to Balkin,
“[s]lavery was not just legal ownership of people; it was an entire system of
conventions, understandings, practices, and institutions that conferred power
and social status and maintained economic and social dependency.”52 Thus,
for Balkin, if Congress is to eliminate the badges of slavery it must
“disestablish all the institutions, practices, and customs associated with
slavery and make sure they can never rise up again.”53 Balkin defends a
“class-protecting strategy,” according to which Congress may protect
minority groups from practices that would deny them equal citizenship.54 For
instance, Balkin argues that Congress could rationally conclude that certain
practices impose second-class citizenship upon women and LGBTQ
individuals, implying that his approach extends to any group subject to
systematic private or public discrimination.55
Contemporary Section 2 proposals generally follow Buchanan and
Balkin in assuming that other groups can bear a badge of slavery.56 But
proponents of the restrictive interpretation have taken issue with this
assumption. William M. Carter, Jr., for example, maintains that inclusive
approaches to the badges metaphor “minimize[] the Amendment’s historical
context and marginalize[] the reality of chattel slavery and its effects upon
the enslaved and society by treating slavery merely as a stepping stone to the
admittedly laudable goal of combating all forms of inequality.”57 According
to Carter, though non-racial groups may be subjects of Section 2 legislation,
a badges of slavery claim must evince a fairly close connection to the history
of American chattel slavery. Section 2 legislation must target practices that
are “closely tied to the structures supporting or created by the system of
slavery.”58
McAward, pressing a number of structural and historical points,
defends perhaps the most restrictive approach to the badges metaphor.
Expansive approaches, she argues, would encroach upon the judiciary, for
they would “allow Congress to grant substantial civil rights protections to
51
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groups that the Supreme Court has not yet deemed to be suspect or quasisuspect classes deserving of heightened federal protection under the
Fourteenth Amendment.”59 Moreover, as a historical matter, McAward takes
issue with Buchanan’s claim that Reconstruction Republicans were
concerned with group-based prejudice per se. As McAward reads the
historical record “the clear expectation was that [Section 2] concerned itself
specifically with race and the legacy of American slavery.”60 In McAward’s
view, Section 2 only licenses Congress “to protect people from the badges
and incidents of slavery imposed on account of race or previous condition of
servitude,” a conclusion that would clearly rule out Section 2 proposals that
include non-racial groups.61
To which practices does the badges metaphor refer? Contemporary
scholars differ over the range of contemporary practices that can be thought
to impose a badge of slavery, and much of this debate turns on questions
similar to those surveyed above, namely, the historical usage of the badges
metaphor; the nature of chattel slavery and its aftermath; the pre- and postenactment legislative record; and the extent to which Reconstruction changed
the structure of the American government.
Here, again, Sydney Buchanan’s work on the 13th Amendment stands
as the most expansive approach to Section 2 legislation. Recall that, for
Buchanan, the central evil of slavery consisted of widespread group-based
prejudice.62 Widespread, group-based prejudice, Buchanan argues, has the
“capacity to clog the channels of opportunity.”63 The victims of such
prejudice “tend[] to be thwarted at every turn in [their] pursuit of normal
human endeavors.”64 In other words, victims of widespread group-based
prejudice suffer the same general type of harm as did the victims of chattel
slavery, and so Congress possesses the authority under Section 2 to prevent
such prejudices from taking root.
Balkin defends a similarly open-ended view of Congress’s Section 2
authority. According to Balkin, the “badges and incidents of slavery” refers
to “all the institutions, practices, and customs associated with slavery.”65
Since Congress possesses the power to eliminate the badges of slavery,
Balkin argues, “Congress has the power to dismantle the interlocking social
structures and status-enforcing practices that were identified with slavery or
that rationalized and perpetuated it.”66 For Balkin, as well as Buchanan, the
59
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badges metaphor would seemingly justify Section 2 legislation that reaches
the kind of group-based prejudice that, when brought before a court, now
generally falls under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. One consequence of this approach is that Section 2 might cover
a broader range of persons and conduct than that covered by the Equal
Protection clause, given that the 13th Amendment has no state action
requirement.67
Other scholars applying the badges metaphor to contemporary legal
issues have not generally defended or cited more expansive views of Section
2 authority. Rather, contemporary applications of the badges metaphor tend
to rely on specific, individual comparisons between evils that persisted under
slavery and present day concerns. Jeffrey J. Pokorak, for example, observes
that “antebellum prejudices and practices kept the prosecution of rape of a
Black woman a rare, if extant, occurrence.”68 In Pokorak’s view,
contemporary disparities in the legal protections afforded to black female
victims of rape thus constitute badges of slavery.69 Andrew Koppelman
argues that anti-abortion laws impose involuntary servitude upon pregnant
women who would otherwise terminate their pregnancies, violating Section
1 of the 13th Amendment. But such laws also violate Section 2, Koppelman
argues, “[b]ecause the subordination of women, like that of blacks, has
traditionally been reinforced by a complex pattern of symbols and practices,
[and] the amendment's prohibition extends to those symbols and practices.”70
Contemporary applications of the badges metaphor tend to follow a
similar argumentative strategy. That is, scholars offering contemporary
Section 2 proposals have tended to assume that present-day inequities that
are sufficiently analogous to a central aspect or aspects of chattel slavery
constitute badges of slavery.71 While I am sympathetic to such arguments,
and while my analysis of the badges metaphor in Section II is intended to
vindicate an expansive view of Section 2, it is nevertheless hard to deny that
67
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the badges metaphor has been “often-invoked but under-theorized.”72 For
example, note that, while Balkin draws upon the history of the metaphor, the
few examples he cites are primarily references to the incidents of chattel
slavery, not its badges, and thus do not obviously support his broader view,
namely, that Congress, utilizing its Section 2 authority, may eliminate all
contemporary “status-enforcing practices.”73 Similarly, though Koppelman
draws a plausible analogy between child-birth and indentured servitude, he
presents almost no historical evidence regarding the usage of the badges
metaphor in support of his conclusion that laws restricting access to abortion
impose badges of slavery.74
Proponents of the restrictive interpretation have constructed a far
more historically-supported account of the meaning of the badges metaphor
and the contours of Section 2. McAward, for example, citing the early
postbellum statements of litigators, legislators, and Supreme Court justices,
argues that two conditions must be met for a contemporary practice to impose
a badge of slavery. Recall that, on the restrictive interpretation, the badges
metaphor, as a legal term of art, referred to the incidents of slavery and to
laws that attempted to reimpose chattel slavery or its de facto equivalent upon
African Americans.75 This usage suggests that Section 2 legislation targeting
the badges of slavery must be limited to addressing contemporary practices
that “mirror a historical incident of slavery.”76 Section 2 is prophylactic, in
that it may only reach contemporary practices, public or private, that “pose a
risk of causing the renewed legal subjugation of the targeted class.”77 Given
that the badges metaphor “is ambiguous and potentially expansive, and
Congress could easily manipulate it to cover conduct far removed from the
historical core of the slave system itself,” these limiting conditions provide
guidance to courts reviewing Section 2 legislation for Congressional
overreach.78
To get a sense of the practical implications of this debate, it is helpful
to consider a few examples. Again, according to the restrictive interpretation,
Section 2 legislation may only address conduct that, “left unaddressed, would
have the cumulative effect of subordinating an entire race to the point that it
would render it unable to participate in and enjoy the benefits of civil
society.”79 According to this view, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 is a
paradigmatic example of Section 2 legislation that satisfies the restrictive
72
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interpretation, for the Act “addressed state laws that sought to reimpose the
incidents of slavery by restricting freed slaves’ fundamental civil liberties.”80
By contrast, most modern applications of the badges metaphor address
conduct that, though wrongful, would not lead to the reimposition of chattel
slavery or its de facto equivalent. Regardless of one’s normative
commitments, it is hard to believe that laws forbidding gay marriage or
restricting access to abortion would reduce gays or women to chattel slaves
or indentured servants nor would such laws plausibly threaten to reestablish
chattel slavery. Thus, for proponents of the restrictive interpretation, Section
2 provides no authority to Congress to address these injustices.
Proponents of the restrictive interpretation do not limit their analysis
only to hypothetical uses of Section 2. Consider, for example, the Matthew
Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act (the “HCPA”). The
HCPA includes two sections, 249(a)(1) and 249(a)(2), identifying the
classifications that receive protection under the Act. Section 249(a)(1)
establishes criminal penalties for assaults motivated by the victim’s “actual
or perceived race, color, religion, [or] national origin.”81 Section 249(a)(1)
was enacted pursuant to Congress’s Thirteenth Amendment Section 2
authority to eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery. The Act’s Findings
section states that “[s]lavery and involuntary servitude were enforced, both
prior to and after the adoption of the 13th amendment to the Constitution of
the United States, through widespread public and private violence directed at
race, color or ancestry.”82 According to this section, “eliminating racially
motivated violence is an important means of eliminating, to the extent
possible, the badges, incidents, and relics of slavery and involuntary
servitude.”83
Section 249(a)(2) of the HCPA establishes criminal penalties for
assaults motivated by the victim’s “gender, sexual orientation, gender
identity, or disability.”84 Though Section 249(a)(2) was enacted pursuant to
Congress’s Commerce Clause authority, it is likely that the constitutionality
of both 249(a)(2) will ultimately depend upon Congress’s Section 2 authority.
This is because, in light of contemporary Commerce Clause jurisprudence it
is doubtful that Congress’s Commerce Clause authority is sufficient to sustain
Section 249(a)(2).85 This leaves Section 2 as the other possible source of
80
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legislative authority for this Section of the Act. As Calvin Massey observed,
249(a)(2) will survive “only if courts accept the fiction” that the badges of
slavery include non-racial badges of slavery.86
For proponents of the restrictive interpretation, the HCPA is likely
unconstitutional. 249(a)(2) is unconstitutional because the badges concept
referred specifically to race-based chattel slavery.87 But 249(a)(1) is also
unconstitutional because, on the restrictive interpretation, Section 2
legislation is warranted only if such legislation targets conduct that, left
unchecked, would lead to the reestablishment of chattel slavery or its de facto
equivalent, and “it is mercifully difficult to envision any racist act” such that
“one could reasonably fear the return of an entire race (or even a single
individual of that race) to slavery or legally subordinate status.”88 At the very
least, Congress has provided no evidence indicating a causal connection
between racially-motivated violence and the reestablishment of chattel
slavery.89 For proponents of the restrictive interpretation, because Congress
has neglected to provide evidence establishing a link between bias-motivated
violence and the reemergence of chattel slavery, 249(a)(1) likely outruns
Congress’ Section 2 authority.
Finally, note that the restrictive interpretation is also at odds with the
Court’s holding in Jones, that Congress may define the badges of slavery
subject only to rational basis review.90 If, as the restrictive interpretation
maintains, the badges metaphor possesses “a finite range of meaning that is
tied closely to the core aspects of the slave system and its aftermath,” courts
confronted with challenges to Section 2 legislation must carefully scrutinize
such legislation to ensure that Congress has not extended the concept beyond
its original scope of application.91 Thus, whereas Jones requires that Section
2 legislation be submitted only to rational basis review, McAward “would
revise Jones by clarifying that Congress's discretion is limited to identifying
which badges and incidents of slavery it will address – not defining them
outright – and then determining how it will address them.”92 Moreover, for
86
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proponents of the restrictive interpretation, revising Jones in this way would
have the added benefit of bringing the Court’s Thirteenth Amendment
jurisprudence more into line with its recent Fourteenth Amendment
jurisprudence.93
To be sure, the restrictive interpretation is not wholly at odds with
contemporary uses of Section 2. For example, McAward raises the
possibility that disparate impact claims might fall under Section 2.94 But on
her view, in order to sustain such claims it would have to be shown that the
disparities in question, if left unaddressed, would bring about the
reemergence of chattel slavery, involuntary servitude, or their de facto
equivalents, and “[t]his could be a very difficult showing to make.”95
Ultimately it is unclear whether, in practice, the restrictive interpretation
would allow for any contemporary Section 2 legislation, though proponents
of the restrictive interpretation accept this result as “the unavoidable
consequence of remaining true to Supreme Court doctrine that Section 1
protects only against slavery and coerced labor and to the prophylactic
purpose of Section 2 legislation.”96
Overall, the restrictive interpretation constitutes a plausible,
historically-grounded interpretation of the badges metaphor, an interpretation
that rules out virtually all contemporary proposals for eradicating purported
badges of slavery. Few of these proposals have engaged at length with the
history of the metaphor; none have demonstrated that the targeted conduct,
left unaddressed, would bring about the reemergence of chattel slavery,
involuntary servitude, or their de facto equivalents. In many cases, this
argument would be rather difficult to defend. Having set forth the main
issues, I shall now turn to the badges metaphor itself. As I demonstrate in the
next Section, the history of the badges metaphor is significantly
underexplored and thus warrants further analysis on its own. After revisiting
this history I shall present and defend an expansive account of Section 2.
II. REDEFINING THE BADGES OF SLAVERY
The restrictive interpretation of the badges metaphor rests on three
93
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key claims: first, that in American political discourse the metaphor, though
somewhat vague, primarily referred to African American skin color and to
the incidents of chattel slavery; second, that the metaphor as it appeared in
American political discourse was distinct from the metaphor as a legal term
of art; and, third, that the legal term of art first emerged in early postbellum
Supreme Court cases solely as a reference to the attempted re-enslavement of
newly freed African Americans. For proponents of the restrictive
interpretation, contemporary applications of the badges metaphor under
Section 2 are historically supported and thus constitutionally sound only if
they similarly target attempts to reestablish chattel slavery or its de facto
equivalent. On this view, since few contemporary injustices threaten to
reestablish chattel slavery or its de facto equivalent, Section 2 is largely dead
letter.
In this Section I introduce historical evidence that rebuts each of these
claims. Contemporary scholarship on Section 2 overlooks a great deal of the
intellectual history of the badges metaphor and thus misconstrues the
meaning of the metaphor in American political discourse and jurisprudence.
This is likely due in part to the fact that the badges metaphor was actually not
a single term but rather a cluster of tropes referring to various stigmatizing
laws and customs. Indeed, as proponents of the restrictive interpretation
acknowledge, politicians, judges, and others often used synonymous
constructions, such as “badge of degradation,” “badge of disgrace,” “badge
of servitude,” and “badge of subjection,” interchangeably with “badge of
slavery.”97 Other, similar constructions referred to laws or social practices
restricting the rights of African Americans as imposing a “mark of
servitude”98 or “mark of degradation,”99 phrases that drew upon the literal
definition of a badge as “a distinctive device, emblem, or mark.”100 Once
these synonymous constructions are taken into account it becomes clear that
the linguistic norms governing usage of the badges metaphor were far more
expansive than the restrictive interpretation allows.
I demonstrate in this Section that the badges metaphor was for
centuries a common trope in the Western political tradition. Originating in
the Roman Republican practice of physical status markings, the metaphor
was taken up in the 17th and 18th centuries by republican critics of
monarchical government, feminist and labor activists, and other moral
97
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reformers. As a legal term of art, the badges metaphor first appeared not in
Rhodes, Blyew, and the Civil Rights Cases, as is commonly claimed, but in
the majority and concurring opinions in Dred Scott v. Sanford. A close
reading of Justice Taney’s majority opinion in Dred Scott demonstrates that
the badges metaphor referred to state actions or social customs that
stigmatized subordinate social groups. In the following Section, I discuss the
implications of adopting a stigma-based interpretation of the badges
metaphor for Section 2 legislation.
A. Origins and Development
The origins of the badges metaphor lie in the Greco-Roman practices
of marking slaves, convicts, prisoners of war, and other low status
individuals. To some extent status markings were a solution to the practical
problem of identification; as many Athenians recognized, slaves made up a
significant proportion of the Athenian population yet could not be reliably
distinguished from free citizens.101 In his commentaries on the Athenian
constitution, for example, Psuedo-Xenophon claims despairingly that in
Athens slaves and citizens were often indistinguishable.102 Writing
approximately eighty years later, Aristotle attempts to solve the problem by
suggesting that “[i]t is nature’s intention also to erect a physical difference
between the bodies of freemen and those of slaves.”103 Yet, he admits,
frequently enough slaves have the appearance of freemen, and vice versa.104
Writing contemporaneously, (the actual) Xenophon describes one
conventional solution for identifying slaves, namely, affixing a “public mark”
onto the slave’s body.105 Branding or, more commonly, tattooing the skin
was used by the Greeks to identify and derogate low status individuals,
particularly slaves, prisoners of war (who were often sold into slavery), and
convicts.106 Delinquent slaves and convicts often had their faces tattooed
with the name of their crimes.107 In the Laws, for instance, Plato proposes
101
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that “if anyone is caught committing sacrilege, if he be a slave or a stranger,
let his offence be written on his face and his hands.”108 The Greek term for
puncturing or marking the skin, στίζειν, referred to marks, στῐ́γμᾰ, or stigma,
signifying disgrace and degradation.109
Under the Roman Empire slaves were also marked by tattoos or
brands; however, Roman slaves were also fitted with a signaculum, a lead
stamp or badge affixed permanently around the neck.110 In addition to
evidence documenting literal badges of slavery, there is at least some
evidence that slave badges were understood metaphorically as well. As
Rutherglen points out, in the Annals Tacitus writes of an episode in which a
conquered king requests through an intermediary that he not have to “endure
any badge of slavery.”111 Interestingly, however, the phrase used,
imaginem servitii, refers to an “image” or “likeness” of servitude, not to a
literal badge, or signaculum, which is understandable in light of the fact that
accompanying the king’s plea is a list of acts, such as surrendering his sword,
that would not constitute a literal badge but would, for a king, surely give off
an image of subjugation.112
Though the origins of the badges metaphor lie in antiquity, it is not until
the 17th and 18th centuries that one finds it in widespread use. While the use
of metal slave collars persisted well into the 18th century, during this period
the scope of the badges metaphor greatly expands.113 For example, for
hundreds of years prior to the American Civil War writers throughout the
English-speaking world used the metaphor, or a variant, to condemn
perceived acts of political oppression in the form of taxation114, tything115,
tributary payments116, the imposition of curfews,117 and political borders.118
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In 17th Century England, members of the egalitarian, republican Leveller and
Digger movements objected to copyhold tenure as “the ancient and almost
antiquated badge of slavery.”119 Writing nearly a century later, David Hume
argued that the English monarch’s prerogative of wardship, which permitted
the monarch to take over the profits of an estate in certain circumstances,
constituted a badge of slavery.120 18th writers invoked the badges metaphor
in condemnation of police entry into private homes,121 economic restrictions
on colonial commercial activity,122 and cultural forms of oppression:
according to William Blackstone, for example, a badge of slavery was
imposed upon the English during the 11th century Norman Conquest of
England, because the occupiers forced English courts to use the French
language.123
While slave badges of a sort were in use in various parts of the United
States throughout the 18th and 19th centuries, the practice was uncommon.124
References to the badges of slavery in this period are plainly metaphorical
and refer to other forms of subordination, such as the wearing of livery – a
uniform, badge, or other visual element “signify[ing] possession and
ownership, that of the lord over the servant.”125 Some Americans loudly
condemned the wearing of livery; in an 1882 Congressional debate New York
House Representative William Robinson furiously declared that “Jefferson
would never have let one of his employés” wear this “degrading…badge of
slavery.”126
Austrian journalist Francis Joseph Grund noted the
“unwillingness of the poorer classes of Americans to hire themselves out as
servants” and their refusal to “submit to the wearing of a livery or any other
badge of servitude.”127 American jurists also tied the badges metaphor to
signifiers and practices associated with feudal hierarchy. In the Civil Rights
Cases, for example, the majority notes that, during the Ancien Régime “all
inequalities and observances exacted by one man from another were
servitudes or badges of slavery” which the revolutionary National Assembly,
119
ROGER CHARLES RICHARDSON, TOWN AND COUNTRYSIDE IN THE ENGLISH
REVOLUTION 184 (1992).
120
THE HISTORY OF ENGLAND, 372 (1775).
121
JOHN PHILLIP REID, THE CONCEPT OF LIBERTY IN THE AGE OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 41 (1988).
122
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY IN THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS, 582 (1776).
123
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, THE OXFORD EDITION OF BLACKSTONE'S: COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND: BOOK IV: OF PUBLIC WRONGS, 269 (2016).
124
See supra, note 17.
125
MATTHEW WARD, THE LIVERY COLLAR IN LATE MEDIEVAL ENGLAND AND WALES:
POLITICS, IDENTITY AND AFFINITY 20 (2016).
126
14 Cong. Rec. 795 (1883).
127
Francis J. Grund, THE AMERICANS IN THEIR MORAL, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL
RELATIONS 66 (1837).

2-Aug-21]

Redefining the Badges of Slavery

23

“in its effort to establish universal liberty, made haste to wipe out and
destroy.”128 Likely the majority is referring to the National Assembly’s
Decree on the Abolition of the Nobility, which abolished, among other
signifiers of hierarchy, the wearing of livery.129
19th century feminists also commonly invoked the badges metaphor. In
an early feminist work, Appeal of One Half the Human Race, Women, Irish
socialists Anna Doyle Wheeler and William Thompson draw an extended
analogy between sexual subordination and slavery.130 In their view,
“woman’s peculiar efforts and powers…are looked upon as an additional
badge of inferiority and disgrace.”131 Similarly, in his well-known 19th
century feminist essay The Subjection of Women, John Stuart Mill points to
the social benefits to be gained “by ceasing to make sex…a badge of
subjection.”132 In a letter to the abolitionist Gerrit Smith, Elizabeth Cady
Stanton claims that 19th century women’s dress, which was both visually
distinctive and physically confining, was a sort of badge, for it signified that
one was a member of a low status group: “why proclaim our sex on the housetops” asks Stanton, “seeing that it is a badge of degradation, and deprives us
of so many rights and privileges wherever we go?”133 African American
women held in bondage were doubly disadvantaged in this respect, in that
slave clothing signified both subordinate gender status and subordinate racial
status. For example, Harriet Ann Jacobs, in her memoir, Incidents in the Life
of a Slave Girl, describes the cheap linsey-woolsey dress given to her by her
master’s wife as “one of the badges of slavery.”134
Pointing to similarities between the plight of disenfranchised women and
that of disenfranchised African Americans, the suffragist activist Virginia
Minor observed of 19th century women that “[h]er disfranchised condition is
a badge of servitude.”135 Stanton used the badges metaphor to compare
abolitionism and the burgeoning women’s rights movement, arguing that
“[t]he badge of degradation is the skin and sex.”136 Similarly, in a letter
128
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decrying the denial of women’s voting rights, the abolitionist William Lloyd
Garrison writes of his “hope…to see the day when neither complexion nor
sex shall be made a badge of degradation.”137 The suffragist activist Angelina
Grimke, protesting the segregation of Quaker meeting houses by seating
herself in an area reserved for blacks, explained that “[w]hile you put this
badge of degradation on our sisters, we feel that it is our duty to share it with
them.”138
Others saw in the American system of slavery a more general denigration
of labor itself. An 1864 editorial in the New York Times notes one welcome
effect of emancipation, namely, that “labor, losing its badge of degradation
should become honorable.”139 William Jay, drafter of the constitution of the
American Antislavery Society, argued that, for the emancipated slave, “labor
is no longer the badge of his servitude.”140 Though such texts specifically
discuss the connotation of labor in the midst of chattel slavery, there was a
more general worry that labor itself stigmatized the laborer, regardless of
complexion. For example, Booker T. Washington argues in Up from Slavery
that “[t]he whole machinery of slavery was so constructed as to cause labour,
as a rule, to be looked upon as a badge of degradation, of inferiority.”141
Massachusetts Senator and abolitionist Henry Wilson invoked this worry as
a reason for passing the 13th amendment, which would, he claimed, uplift “the
poor white man…impoverished, debased, dishonored by the system that
makes toil a badge of disgrace.”142 The British pamphleteer and
parliamentarian William Cobbet similarly railed against working-class
poverty, which, he claimed was “the great badge, the never-failing badge of
slavery.”143
This broad range of meaning is evident even in the statements of antislavery Congressmen during debates over how to best assist free African
Americans. For example, though the political origins of the badges metaphor
are commonly traced to Congressional debates over the Civil Rights Act of
1866, this is not the first appearance of the phrase in the Congressional
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record.144 During 1864 Senate debates over the repeal of the Fugitive Slave
Acts and the first Freedmen’s Bureau Act, Massachusetts Senator and chair
of the Senate’s Select Committee on Slavery and Freedom Charles Sumner
repeatedly invoked the metaphor to condemn racial segregation in public
facilities as well as the pernicious political influence of the slave-holding
states more generally. “The Fugitive Slave Bill,” Sumner declared, was
“imposed upon the North as a badge of subjugation.”145 In a later speech,
defending a provision of the Freedmen’s Bureau Act that guaranteed court
access to newly freed African Americans, Sumner argued that unequal access
to civil and military tribunals constituted a “disability and exclusion” that
imposed “the badge of Slavery.”146
According to the restrictive interpretation, during the antebellum period
the badges metaphor primarily referred to the legal incidents of chattel
slavery or to the status connotations of black skin.147 However, as we have
seen, historically the metaphor has possessed a broad range of meanings.
During the antebellum period the metaphor was invoked in condemnation not
just of racial injustice but also of unjust economic and political relations,
including those based on gender and class.148 Moreover, as Sumner’s usage
indicates, a badge of slavery could be imposed even upon free African
Americans who faced racial discrimination in access to public facilities. The
first premise of the restrictive interpretation, that in American political
discourse the metaphor referred only to African American skin color and to
the incidents of chattel slavery, is belied by the historical examples presented
above.
Even for American critics of chattel slavery the metaphor was not limited
to the legal incidents of racialized chattel slavery or to the status connotations
of black skin; rather, the metaphor could refer to a variety of signifiers
associated with racial hierarchy, such as segregated seating and racially
exclusionary access to public institutions. References to skin color, gendered
dress, uniforms, manual labor, and physical segregation imply that badges of
slavery were visible signifiers of subordinate social status.149 But the badges
metaphor denoted other forms of subordination as well. Taxation, tything,
tributary payments, the imposition of curfews, and Fugitive Slave Acts were
144
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also condemned as badges of slavery, indicating that the badges metaphor
was not strictly limited to visible signifiers. As I discuss below, in one of the
badges’ metaphor earliest appearances in American constitutional law the
metaphor refers not to visible signifiers but to stigmatizing laws and social
customs.150
The badges metaphor, then, was not strictly limited to visual signifiers
but included other indicators of subordinate status. What unifies the various
invocations of the badges metaphor, then, is not any particular type of
signifier. Rather, it is a concern for social signifiers, of whatever sort, that
stigmatize and degrade members of a discrete social group who are deprived
of important rights or liberties. A rough definition of a badge of slavery thus
runs as follows: a badge of slavery is a public indicator of subordinate
political or social status. This reading of the badges metaphor makes the best
sense of the historical usages I surveyed above. Moreover, it has the virtue
of drawing a close connection between the equal protection principle
underlying both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments.151
B. The Badges of Republican Slavery
This rough definition of the badges metaphor is a useful starting point;
however, it is incomplete. To see this, we must move beyond particular
examples to examine the conceptual framework underlying the badges
metaphor’s many uses. In short, the badges metaphor must be understood in
light of the republican conceptual framework that structured much 18th and
19th century American political discourse regarding slavery and
subordination. 18th and 19th century American political discourse drew
deeply from two fonts of republican thought.152 The first was that of
150
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republican Rome. For Roman historians such as Tacitus, Livy, Cicero,
Sallust, and Gaius, liberty is understood in terms of the basic distinction
between citizen and slave.153 As Gaius writes in his Institutes, in legal terms
a citizen was sui juris, or under his own authority, whereas a slave was
potestate domini, that is, subject to the jurisdiction of their masters.154 As
such, slaves were “perpetually subject or liable to harm or punishment,” or to
other arbitrary interference, from their masters.155 But slavery was not
thought of as a strictly legal condition. Roman moralists and historians
believed that anyone who was subject to the will of another, whether as a
matter of public authority or private power, lived in a state of servitude.156
Not just individuals but entire political communities could be considered
slaves in this sense.157
The distinction between the citizen, who is in some significant respect
independent, and the slave, whose choices can be arbitrarily interfered with,
is not only central to republican thought;158 it is also central to 18th and 19th
century American political discourse concerning slavery. In political
pamphlets and other public writings, educated 18th Americans, well-versed
in the works of Tacitus and the other major Roman historians, selfconsciously drew upon the republican conception of slavery.159 In John
Adams’ work, for example, the badges metaphor appears amidst a number of
American legal system. See, e.g., JOHN GREVILLE AGARD POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN
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references to Tacitus’ view of slavery; Tacitus, as I noted above, provides
one of the earliest examples of the badges metaphor.160 Educated 19th century
Americans also would have been familiar with classical views of slavery, and
references to antiquity similarly colored 19th century political discourse.161
To fully appreciate how deeply the Roman republican vocabulary
influenced American discourse on slavery, it is necessary to consider a
second source of republican rhetoric, namely, the writings of 17th century
English Commonwealthmen such as Henry Neville, James Harrington, and
Algernon Sidney.162 These writers exhibited a similar indebtedness to the
Roman republican conception of slavery. According to Sidney, for example,
“[h]e is a slave who serves the best and gentlest man in the world, as well as
he who serves the worst; and he does serve him, if he must obey his
commands, and depends upon his will.”163 For the Commonwealthmen,
slavery was very often described as subjection to arbitrary, which is to say
unchecked, power. 17th century farmers and artisans, for instance, sought “to
abolish all arbitrary Power.” Similarly, Sydney held that “laws are not made
by kings…because nations will be governed by rule, and not arbitrarily.”164
For Sydney, “the multitude [who live] under the yoke” of an arbitrary ruler
bear “a badge of slavery.”165
18th century American writers widely adopted the concepts and
vocabulary of Sidney and other Commonwealthmen. In 18th century political
texts, for example, “arbitrary,” becomes a watchword denoting tyrannical
power, especially that wielded by the British monarchy over the colonies.
According to one author, the British government possessed “a settled, fixed
plan for enslaving the colonies, or bringing them under arbitrary
government.”166 For many 18th century Americans, a despot was a ruler
“bound by no law or limitation but his own will,” and the exercise of arbitrary

160

JOHN ADAMS & CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 561 (1850)
(citing Tacitus’s view of slavery in support of the claim that ancient monarchies subjected
citizens to slavery).
161
MARGARET MALAMUD, ANCIENT ROME AND MODERN AMERICA 41 (2009).
(observing that “[l]ate eighteenth- century and early nineteenth-century readers used in
schools contained a number of passages on the topic of slavery and liberty including several
passages taken from Roman historians” such as Tacitus).
162
BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 43
(2017).
163
ALGERNON SIDNEY, DISCOURSES CONCERNING GOVERNMENT 319 (1704).
164
JAMES HARRINGTON, THE POLITICAL WORKS OF JAMES HARRINGTON 171 (2010)
(asserting that to be free under government is “not to be controlled but by the law; and that
framed by every private man unto no other end…than to protect the liberty of every private
man, which by that means comes to be the liberty of the commonwealth”).
165
See Sidney, supra note 163 at 442.
166
See BAILYN, supra note 152 at 119.

2-Aug-21]

Redefining the Badges of Slavery

29

power characterized despotic regimes.167
19th century labor republicans and abolitionists were also wont to rely,
implicitly or explicitly, on this rhetoric. Labor republican Seth Luther, for
instance, decried the “tyrannical government of the mills,” which, he claimed,
was defined by “one sided and arbitrary rule” over wage-laborers.168
Angelina Grimke, whose invocation of the badges metaphor I noted above,
wrote of the “arbitrary power” that slave owners wielded over slaves.169 In a
letter from William Lloyd Garrison to the editor of the Boston Courier,
Garrison quotes extensively from Sidney’s Discourses on Government “in
order to show, beyond all contradiction, that Algernon Sidney was an
Abolitionist of the modern school, as “fanatical,” “incendiary,”
“denunciatory,” and “blood-thirsty,” as even [British abolitionist] George
Thompson himself.170 Garrison then proceeds to quote Sidney’s definition
of slavery, according to which a slave is “a man who can neither dispose of
his person or goods, but enjoys all at the will of his master.”171
As the historian Eric Foner observes, in 18th century American political
discourse “slavery was primarily a political category, shorthand for the denial
of one’s personal and political rights by arbitrary government.”172 This usage
continued into the 19th century, influencing not just the abolitionist movement
but the early feminist and workers’ movements as well. To be sure, from the
fact that many 18th and 19th century Americans used classically republican
vocabulary to condemn slavery one cannot conclude that they understood
slavery in precisely the same manner.173 Even among abolitionists there were
deep disagreements over what were the core components of slavery.174
Likely the same point can be made with regard to the badges metaphor: given
the evident disagreement over what constituted slavery there surely also
would have been disagreement over how to identify its badges. It would thus
be too quick to conclude from the evidence given above that from usage of
the badges metaphor one can infer a commitment to philosophical
167
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republicanism.
At the same time, however, the badges metaphor cannot be fully
understood shorn of the broader republican conceptual framework that
structured 18th and 19th century American political discourse. The restrictive
interpretation requires that we ignore this framework, narrowing our
understanding of the badges metaphor to those instances in which the
metaphor referred to African American skin color or to the incidents of
racialized chattel slavery. But this is an arbitrary restriction, for there is no
evidence that Republicans and abolitionists limited their usage of the
metaphor in this way, let alone other 18th and 19th century American political
actors. Indeed, as I have shown above, there is a good deal of evidence
demonstrating just the opposite.
The restrictive interpretation fails to account for this evidence and thus is
unable to explain why the badges metaphor was so often invoked in
condemnation of gender and class subordination, not to mention other
perceived injustices that bore little resemblance to racialized chattel slavery
and its aftermath. Taking into account the republican background to the
badges metaphor, by contrast, provides a plausible explanation of the
metaphor’s many appearances in European and American political discourse.
Republicanism provided for European and American reformers a conceptual
vocabulary useful for identifying and denouncing certain group-based
deprivations of important rights and liberties. Importantly, on the republican
view, groups deprived of important rights and liberties possessed a separate,
and unequal, status. While chattel slavery constituted the extreme end of
status inequality, the badges metaphor was very often applied to inequalities
that fell far short of racialized, chattel slavery.
C. The Badges of Slavery from Dred Scott to The Civil Rights
Cases
Proponents of the restrictive interpretation maintain that, in American
political discourse, the badges metaphor referred narrowly “to the color of an
African American’s skin or other indications of legal and social inferiority
connected with slavery.”175 As I demonstrated above, however, the badges
metaphor was a widely-circulated political trope, or cluster of tropes,
commonly used to condemn subjection to arbitrary exercises of authority.
The metaphor was never restricted only to the law of slavery but included
discriminatory practices targeting free African Americans. The metaphor
also ranged beyond race to include class and gender.
The second objection to the restrictive interpretation concerns the
175
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origin and meaning of the metaphor within American jurisprudence. The
badges metaphor does not first appear, as proponents of the restrictive
interpretation assert, in Blyew, Rhodes, or the Civil Rights Cases. Rather, the
badges metaphor appears earlier, in Dred Scott v. Sanford.176 Moreover, in
Dred Scott Taney does not use the metaphor to refer only to the incidents of
chattel slavery. As I shall demonstrate here, Taney uses the badges metaphor
to refer to state actions or social customs that stigmatized African Americans,
whether free or enslaved. That a badge of slavery could be imposed upon
free African Americans, living in states that had permanently abolished
slavery, is further evidence against the restrictive interpretation.
The facts, holding, and aftermath of Dred Scott are, of course, well
known: Scott, an enslaved African American, brought suit in federal court,
arguing that upon establishing residence in a free state and in federal territory
he and his family had become American citizens.177 Recall that Taney’s
majority opinion is not simply intended to rebut the claim that Scott and his
family were citizens. Taney endeavors to show more generally that African
Americans always were and always would be excluded from the “new
political family which the Constitution brought into existence.”178
Taney’s argument revolves around proving that African Americans
had always been treated as an outcast group, and he repeatedly uses the
badges metaphor to describe the stigmatizing effect of laws that maintained
racial hierarchy. Racially discriminatory laws, according to Taney,
“stigmatized” and “impressed…deep and enduring marks of inferiority and
degradation” upon African Americans as a group.179 As Taney recognized,
however, in some states free African Americans could become citizens and
could vote, suggesting that, even if not granted the full rights of citizenship,
free African Americans possessed some standing within their political
communities.180 Yet Taney maintains that the existence of free African
Americans does not refute his argument, for free African Americans “were
identified in the public mind with the race to which they belonged, and
176
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regarded as a part of the slave population rather than the free.”181
Taney’s point is that even those African Americans free from the legal
incidents of slavery nevertheless bore its badges. To support this claim Taney
cites a number of laws in free states that denied important rights and
privileges to African Americans.182 It is worth paying particular attention to
Taney’s discussion of anti-miscegenation statutes, for Taney focuses less on
the penal function of these laws and more on the fact that such laws served
to express the white majority’s view that free African Americans were less
than full citizens. For example, Taney cites one anti-miscegenation law
forbidding
“the marriage of any white person with any negro, Indian, or
mulatto, and inflicts a penalty of fifty pounds upon anyone who shall
join them in marriage, and declares all such marriage absolutely null
and void, and degrades thus the unhappy issue of the marriage by
fixing upon it the stain of bastardy.”183
This law, Taney asserts, imposed a “mark of degradation” upon African
Americans.184 But note that Taney is not referring solely to the legal
restrictions on interracial marriage; rather, he is referring to the expressive
effect of such laws.185 Anti-miscegenation laws, as Taney is keen to point
out, placed a stain – that is, a social stigma – upon those who would enter into
such marriages and upon the children of any such marriages.186
Taney’s usage of the badges metaphor in Dred Scott is deeply
revealing, and it cuts against the restrictive interpretation. First, Taney’s
usage of the metaphor demonstrates that the purported distinction between
the metaphor in political discourse and the metaphor as a legal term of art is
illusory. Consider, for example, that Taney’s usage of the metaphor is
echoed, to opposite effect, by the abolitionist William Loyd Garrison. For
Garrison, too, prohibitions against interracial marriage constituted
“disgraceful badge[s] of servitude.”187 But note that Rutherglen characterizes
Garrison’s usage as political, not legal. That is, in Rutherglen’s view,
181
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Garrison is pointing out that “[l]aws against miscegenation…did not draw
out a consequence of actual slavery but were an indication of symbolic
slavery.”188 While Rutherglen argues that “[t]his sense of “badge” rarely
appeared in the law of slavery,” one would be hard pressed to find a more
canonical example of 19th century legal views of slavery than those expressed
in Dred Scott.189
Taney’s focus on anti-miscegenation laws reveals yet another
weakness of the restrictive interpretation. According to the restrictive
interpretation, a badge of slavery, as a legal term of art, referred only to laws
restricting the rights of African Americans.190 However, the antimiscegenation laws that Taney cites threatened punishment for whites, albeit
to a lesser extent than blacks. Whites who attempted to intermarry would be
temporarily made servants, a degraded status for a white citizen though one
still superior to that of a chattel slave.191 In Taney’s view the point of such
laws was to maintain an “impassable barrier” between racial groups, thereby
reinforcing the stigmatized status of African Americans as a group.192 While
a law restricting the rights of African Americans was the most direct route to
this outcome, the racial boundary Taney sought to defend could be reinforced
by punishing whites as well. Only a stigma-based interpretation is able to
explain how, in states that had permanently abolished slavery, a law
restricting the rights of free African Americans and whites imposed a badge
of slavery.
Finally, it is important to note that Taney’s reasoning draws a clear
connection between the badges metaphor and another concept central to
understanding the Thirteenth Amendment, namely, custom. The Thirteenth
Amendment directly regulates private conduct, for, as the framers of the
amendment were aware, social customs were essential to the legitimation and
maintenance of the slave system as a whole and to the law of slavery in
particular.193 Courts relied on local customs “to fill gaps or resolve
188
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ambiguities” in the law of slavery as well as to “to generate the legal, social,
and civil disabilities of the enslaved.”194 Courts cited local customs, for
example, as justification for imposing heightened punishments for enslaved
individuals who assaulted whites but lesser punishments for whites who
assaulted enslaved African Americans.195 By legally sanctioning these
violent customs, courts both ratified and reinforced their stigmatizing effect,
a point to which I shall return in Section III.
Taney’s usage of the badges metaphor similarly links racially
discriminatory custom with laws maintaining African American
subordination. As Justice Taney surely must have known, a law annulling
interracial marriages could stigmatize its targets only in virtue of the fact that
interracial couples faced severe social sanction from whites committed to
maintaining racial hierarchy.196 Similarly, a law which fixed upon an
interracial marriage the “stain of bastardy” also drew upon private custom, as
the degraded status of a bastard was as much a social as a legal condition.197
The broader point is that, as Taney’s analysis indicates, a badge of slavery
was not simply equivalent to a legal incident of slavery, nor was it solely a
reference to skin color. Rather, a badge of slavery was imposed by state
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actions or social customs that stigmatized subordinate groups.
It is instructive to compare Taney’s usage of the badges metaphor
with how the metaphor was used several decades later in the Civil Rights
Cases. In the Civil Rights Cases there is a telling divergence between the
majority and dissent regarding the meaning of the metaphor. Justice Bradley,
writing for the majority, claims that prior to the abolition of slavery “[m]ere
discriminations on account of race or color were not regarded as badges of
slavery.”198 “There were thousands of free colored people in this country
before the abolition of slavery” Bradley asserts, “yet no one at that time
thought that it was any invasion of his personal status as a freeman because
he was not admitted to all the privileges enjoyed by white citizens, or because
he was subjected to discriminations” in access to public facilities.199 Thus,
he argues, Section 2 cannot sustain the provisions of the Civil Rights Act of
1876 banning discrimination in public accommodations.
For proponents of the restrictive interpretation “it is not immediately
clear that the majority was wrong to limit the coverage of the Section 2 power
to public actors,” because “the term “badge” of slavery was regarded in
judicial circles as a post-emancipation synonym” for the incidents of
slavery.200 Yet, as we have seen, in Dred Scott Taney, following the common
meaning of the metaphor, uses the badges metaphor to refer to racially
discriminatory laws in states that had abolished slavery. Such laws imposed
badges of slavery not because they maintained or attempted to reimpose the
slave system; they imposed badges of slavery because, in conjunction with
the white community’s social customs, they imposed a stigma upon African
Americans as a group.
A more historically grounded understanding of the badges metaphor
is to be found in Justice Harlan’s dissent. According to Justice Harlan,
“discrimination practised [sic] by corporations and individuals in the exercise
of their public or quasi-public functions is a badge of servitude,” and, as such,
is a proper target of Thirteenth Amendment regulation.201 Though employing
the metaphor to opposite ends, Harlan’s usage of the metaphor follows
Taney’s in that it supposes that public discrimination reinforced by private
custom may impose a badge of slavery. In fact, in his opinion Harlan invokes
Dred Scott to castigate the majority’s cramped construal of the
Reconstruction Amendments. This is a refrain Harlan would sound again in
Plessy v. Ferguson, where Harlan reiterates his view that the “arbitrary
separation of citizens on the basis of race while they are on a public highway
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is a badge of servitude.”202 Of course, the Plessy majority infamously denies
that segregation marks African-Americans with “a badge of inferiority.”203
That the restrictive interpretation aligns more closely with the Plessy majority
opinion than with Harlan’s now-canonical dissent provides yet another
reason to reject the view.204
Ultimately the restrictive interpretation is untenable. The badges
metaphor was by no means unique to American political discourse, nor did it
refer solely to chattel slavery or to the incidents thereof. Long before it
entered American political discourse the badges metaphor referred to a wide
variety of formal and informal stigmatizing practices. American political
actors who took up the metaphor followed this broad pattern of usage, such
that for many politically active 19th century Americans stigmatizing practices
associated with race, class, and gender imposed badges of slavery. Moreover,
the badges metaphor as a legal term of art, first appearing in Dred Scott, did
not fundamentally deviate from the metaphor as found in popular or political
discourse. In both cases a badge of slavery referred to state actions or social
customs that stigmatized subordinate groups.
III. ERADICATING THE CONTEMPORARY BADGES OF SLAVERY
Section 2 is not limited to preventing the reimposition chattel slavery
or its de facto equivalent. Section 2 grants Congress the authority to target
stigmatizing laws and social customs, for these practices impose a badge of
slavery. I shall now discuss how this interpretation of Section 2 can be
applied in practice. As there are far too many proposed uses of Section 2 to
discuss in this space, the discussion here is meant to be illustrative. My aim
is to provide a general approach to constructing and assessing Section 2
arguments in light of the expansive interpretation I presented above.
First, consider again the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate
Crimes Prevention Act (the “HCPA”). The HCPA falls within Congress’s
Section 2 authority, and the expansive interpretation of the badges metaphor
explains why. On the expansive interpretation, to determine whether
249(a)(1) is a valid exercise of Congress’s Section 2 authority it is necessary
to determine whether bias-motivated violence is a social custom that imposes
stigmatic harm upon a particular group. Though a concern for stigmatic harm
traditionally sounds in equal protection, the doctrine is readily transferrable
to the Thirteenth Amendment context. Whether considered under the
Fourteenth or the Thirteenth Amendment, the determining factor is whether
202
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the act in question singles out a particular group for status-based deprivations
of rights, liberties, or privileges that are generally available to others.205
Bias-motivated racial and ethnic violence imposes stigmatic harm in
this sense. Though bias-motivated violence results in harm to individual
victims, such crimes are symbolic acts that single out particular groups. As
hate crime researcher Barbara Perry observes, bias-motivated violence is
“generally directed toward those whom our society has traditionally
stigmatized and marginalized” with the intended aim of “reaffirm[ing] the
precarious hierarchies that characterize” social and political life.206 Through
the infliction of brutal violence perpetrators intend “not only to subordinate
the victim, but also to subdue his or her community, to intimidate a group of
people” defined by a particular trait or perceived difference from the norm.207
This message of intimidation does not go unheard: as survey evidence
reveals, members of a community targeted by bias-motivated violence report
fearing, with good reason, that they are not fully and equally protected by
existing law and that this lack of protection leaves members of their group
subject to the violent and arbitrary impulses of malicious private actors.208
The long history of private violence targeting racial and ethnic
minorities in the United States largely tracks these generalizations. For
example, violence directed towards African Americans in the postReconstruction era was not simply an attempt to reestablish chattel slavery.
Rather, as legal historian Ely Aaronson notes, extralegal violence targeting
African Americans, alongside the state’s unwillingness to seek redress for
black victims, “symbolize[d] and enforce[d] the second-class status of
African Americans.”209 Similar points apply to violence directed towards
ethnic minorities. As Perry notes, ethnic violence, for perpetrators, is a means
by which to punish groups who are perceived to have “overstep[ped] their
boundaries by assuming they, too, are worthy of first-class citizenship.”210
Indeed, the recent surge of attacks targeting Asian-Americans is but the latest
episode in a long history of violence aimed at subordinating and stigmatizing
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communities perceived as foreign.211 Given the stigmatizing intent and effect
of bias-motivated violence, 249(a)(1) is well-within Congress’s Section 2
authority.
A slightly different analysis is required for Section 249(a)(2) of the
HCPA. Section 249(a)(2) establishes criminal penalties for assaults
motivated by the victim’s “gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, or
disability.”212 The constitutionality of Section 249(a)(2) turns on whether
Congress can use its Section 2 authority to protect non-racial groups. As I
demonstrated above, according to historical usage, women, laborers, and
others could bear a badge of slavery.213 There is thus a prima facie case for
including non-racial groups under Section 2.
That being said, it is undeniable that chattel slavery uniquely targeted
African Americans, and given the close association of chattel slavery with
racial subordination, Section 2 proposals that include non-racial
classifications will likely face skepticism from courts, among other legal
actors. Whereas many scholars who have offered Section 2 proposals seem
to assume that Section 2 straightforwardly extends to all groups, I propose a
compromise: while it is within Congress’s authority to extend Section 2
coverage to non-racial groups, when exercising this authority Congress must
provide evidence that the stigmatic harms targeted are fairly closely
analogous to stigmatic harms suffered by African Americans. This higher
evidentiary standard would ensure that Section 2 legislation does not drift too
far from the one of the core aims of the Thirteenth Amendment, namely,
protecting African Americans from stigmatizing and degrading treatment.
249(a)(2) is a valid use of Congress’s Section 2 authority, even
assuming a heightened evidentiary standard. This is because violence
targeting individuals on the basis of gender, sex, or sexual orientation is
closely analogous to violence targeting racial minorities. First, as a number
of feminist scholars have pointed out, both forms of bias-motivated violence
serve to single out and stigmatize the victim’s broader social group in order
to maintain group hierarchy.214 Moreover, historically the criminal justice
system has similarly failed to protect gays and lesbians from violent attack
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and often failed to prosecute those who commit such attacks. In fact, in some
cases state agents are among those perpetrating homophobic violence.215
Violence targeting LGBTQ individuals thus bears important similarities to
violence targeting African Americans.
The case for Section 2 authority is even stronger given the
relationship between customary homophobic violence and criminal defense
law. Consider that most state courts still permit the so-called “gay panic”
defense in criminal trials. The gay panic defense is an informal defensive
strategy that relies “on the notion that a criminal defendant should be excused
or justified if his violent actions were in response to a (homo)sexual
advance.”216 In gay panic cases masculine social customs regarding the
infliction of homophobic violence are used to generate a special set of legal
disabilities for LGBTQ individuals.217 The defense also accords a special set
of legal privileges for heterosexual men: according to one analysis, for
example, the gay panic defense successfully leads to a reduction of charges
in about one-third of all cases in which it is raised, despite the fact that “the
majority of these homicides involve incredible violence.”218 By permitting
the gay panic defense the law incorporates and legitimizes heterosexist social
customs, just as the law of slavery incorporated and legitimized social
customs regarding the infliction violence upon the enslaved.219
Analogical arguments can be used to extend Congress’s Section 2
authority to other groups as well. Contemporary legal scholars have plausibly
argued, for example, that private violence targeting women imposes a badge
of slavery. Though none of these scholars have offered a historical
interpretation of the badges metaphor, these arguments nonetheless
persuasively demonstrate that gender-based violence stigmatizes women.
First, as I noted in Section II, 19th century abolitionists and feminists invoked
the badges metaphor to draw attention to commonalities between race and
gender subordination. For 19th century feminists, one crucial commonality
was their similar susceptibility to private violence and a lack of legal
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recourse.220 A convincing argument for Section 2 legislation including
gender classifications would build on this analogy by noting that, similar to
racial and ethnic violence, contemporary gender-based violence “terrorizes
the collective by victimizing the individual” in order to “establish an
“appropriate” hierarchy in which men are dominant, women subordinate.”221
Moreover, the stigmatizing effects of gender-based private violence endure
in part due to the unwillingness of state actors to fully investigate and
prosecute such crimes.222 Violent crimes targeting African American
women, in particular, are systematically under prosecuted.223
Though this is just the outline of an argument for extending Section 2
coverage to women, the similarities to racially bias-motivated racial violence
are apparent. Just as with the HCPA, through a combination of private
violence and state neglect women are singled out for a status-based disability.
To be sure, expanding Section 2 coverage to new groups via analogical
reasoning may seem foreign to Thirteenth Amendment jurisprudence.
Identifying new groups that warrant heightened antidiscrimination protection
has become almost exclusively a Fourteenth Amendment issue. Yet it is
worth revisiting this common assumption about the appropriate method of
interpretation for each Amendment. As the history surveyed in Section II
reveals, many groups adopted the badges metaphor precisely because they
saw analogies between the stigmatization inherent in chattel slavery and their
own subordinate position. Furthermore, as Alexander Tsesis has argued,
expanding the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment to include new groups
goes “well beyond the text of the Amendment, the intent of its founders, and
the internal coherence of its sections.”224 And yet it is hard to imagine a
modern equal protection doctrine that lacks protections for women, among
other groups.225 The historical usage of the badges metaphor indicates that
we should be similarly willing to extend the scope of Section 2. Regardless
of identity, any group that is singled out for status-based deprivations of
rights, liberties, or privileges warrants Section 2 protection.
CONCLUSION: SECTION 2 OPTIMISM
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A badge of slavery referred to state actions or social customs that
stigmatized subordinate groups. Going forward, Section 2 proposals and
arguments should seek to demonstrate that the targeted injustice singles out
particular groups for status-based deprivations of rights, liberties, or
privileges that are generally available to others. I believe that this definition
best accounts for the historical evidence, and that badges of slavery endure to
this day, prompting a renewed need for Section 2 legislation. Yet it is also
reasonable to wonder whether expansive uses of Section 2 can find traction
outside of the legal academy.
The skeptical reactions that greet many badges proposals stem from a
paradox inherent in contemporary Thirteenth Amendment scholarship. As
Jamal Greene observes, many legal scholars are Thirteenth Amendment
“optimists,” in that they believe that “the Amendment prohibits in its own
terms, or should be read by Congress to prohibit, practices that one opposes
but that do not in any obvious way constitute either chattel slavery or
involuntary servitude as those terms are ordinarily understood.”226 Most
Thirteenth Amendment proposals – such as using the Amendment to combat
abortion restrictions and racial profiling – are optimistic in this sense. But as
Greene points out, the suggestion that any of these injustices “qualif[y] as
slavery or may be regulated as such does not merely feel technically incorrect
as a matter of current legal doctrine; it intuitively seems to misunderstand the
English language and the terms of art used within it.”227 That is, no matter
how clever the argument or how compelling the analogy, a good deal of
contemporary Thirteenth Amendment proposals simply do not survive first
contact with the text of the amendment.
As Greene acknowledges, however, the legal and political import of
Section 2 is far from settled. Indeed, one of the main points of his Article is
to juxtapose “the relative narrowness of Section 1 and the relative
generativity of Section 2.”228 For Greene the generativity of Section 2 will
not come from judicial interpretation, which, he believes, will almost surely
disappoint Thirteenth Amendment optimists. For Greene the generativity of
Section 2 must come instead from political mobilization and Congressional
legislation. In his view, Section 2 “burden[s] Congress with a constitutional
responsibility to root out pervasive and demeaning inequality and subjugation
even in the absence of local governmental action.”229 Focusing on Section 2,
as opposed to Section 1, “may help, in small ways, to motivate the political
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process necessary to craft legislation ultimately grounded in other substantive
provisions.”230
I am slightly more optimistic than Greene, in that I do not foreclose the
possibility that a future Court could take up the expansive interpretation of
the badges metaphor. The expansive interpretation possesses a respectable
judicial lineage, running from Taney’s anti-canonical majority opinion in
Dred Scott to Harlan’s canonical dissent in Plessy, and then on to Jones, upon
which a future Court may rightly wish to build. Nevertheless, Greene’s
caution is well-taken, and one underlying aim of this Article has been to show
how Section 2 arguments might contribute to the sort of political and
legislative mobilization that he envisions. Debates over the badges metaphor
are, of course, debates about the ways in which certain words were used in
the past. At the same time they are, more importantly, debates over how to
frame the relationship between past practices and present conditions. If we
conceive of slavery as a temporally discrete legal regime, and if we
understand the badges metaphor as a reference to distinct features of this
regime, then the 13th Amendment likely is a dead end for most contemporary
purposes.
As I have argued in this Article, however, the historical evidence does not
compel these interpretative choices. On the contrary, many who used the
badges metaphor sought to eradicate not just a particular legal regime but also
the commitments to group hierarchy, stigma, and subordination that underlay
the slave system. Accordingly, Section 2, and the badges metaphor, call on
Congress and the public to eradicate the lingering traces of group stigma, in
whatever form they are found. To do so requires public discussion and debate
over the extent to which contemporary inequalities follow from, or at least
reflect, the unjust hierarchies of the past. This is a discussion that some
vehemently wish to avoid.231 But this resistance is, perhaps, a hopeful
indication of the critical potential that Section 2 retains.
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